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Abstract—Cognitive radio technology, which is designed to
enhance spectrum utilization, depends on the success of oppor-
tunistic access, where secondary users (SUs) exploit spectrum
void unoccupied by primary users (PUs) for transmissions. We
note that the system behaviors are very similar to the interactions
among different species coexisting in an ecosystem. However,
SUs of a selfish nature or of misleading information may make
concurrent transmissions with PUs for additional incentives, and
thus disrupt the entire ecosystem. By exploiting this vulnerability,
this paper proposes a novel distributed denial-of-service (DoS)
attack where invasive species, i.e., malicious users (MUs), induce
originally normal-behaved SUs to execute concurrent transmis-
sions with PUs and thus collapse the cognitive radio network. We
adopt stochastic geometry to model the spatial distributions of
PUs, SUs, and MUs for the analysis of the mutual interference
among them. The access strategy of each SU in the spectrum
sharing ecosystem, which evolves with the experienced payoffs
and interference, is modeled by an evolutionary game. Based
on the evolutionary stable strategy concept, we could efficiently
identify the fragile operating region at which normal-behaved
SUs are eventually evolved to conduct concurrent transmissions
and thus to cause the ruin of the network.
Index Terms—cognitive radio, denial-of-service (DoS) attack,
ecosystems, evolutionary game, selfish behavior
I. INTRODUCTION
Facing the dynamic and considerable wireless resource
demands, the typical spectrum management approach of al-
locating fixed spectrum bands to licensed users is criticized
by its underutilization. Cognitive radio (CR) receives a lot
of attentions in both academic and industrial areas since
it increases spectrum utilization by exploiting local sensing
information and agility/dynamic spectrum access. Specifically,
unlicensed secondary users (SUs) sense surrounding environ-
ment and exploit the spectrum hole unoccupied by licensed
primary users (PUs) for secondary transmission with minimal
interference to PUs [1]. In this way, responsibility for avoiding
harmful interference is shifted from the regulatory with fixed
mandate to equipments that can adapt at runtime [2]. Such
a distributed and light-handed regulation assumes that SUs
comply with the sharing etiquette such as evacuating the
spectrum upon sensing primary transmission to ensure the
normal operation of CR.
In this paper we propose to analyze the stability of a CR
network from the perspective of evolution from biology. Using
terminologies from ecological biology, the entire CR network
can be viewed as an ecosystem [3], where SUs of different
spectrum access strategies are different species, the common
resource shared by all species are the vacant wireless spectrum,
and the fitness of an SU is the utility it received given the
profile of spectrum access strategies of all SUs. Notably, the
well-known “survival of the fittest” phenomenon applies to CR
network as well. The autonomous spectrum access behavior
of CR leads to the optimal spectrum access strategy that
maximizes the utility, which is exactly analog to developing
the best fitting rule to survive in an ecosystem. However, such
evolutionary stability may be disrupted or weakened when
“invasive species” (such as malicious attackers) come into
play [4]. SUs controlled by malicious attackers can be viewed
as a new species with the objective of disrupting the entire
ecosystem. As will be studied in this paper, the presence of
such a disruptive species may consume many resources such
that the spectrum access strategies of normal SUs become
more aggressive due to the adaption rule, and eventually
resulting in less evolutionary stability, or even worse, the
extinction of SUs with regular spectrum access strategies.
To realize such attack, we investigate the possible target in
CR for adversarial or malicious users (MUs) aiming to launch
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks [5], [6], [7], [8]. Typically, the
critical functionalities for CR ecosystems, including spectrum
sensing, agile radio, and light-handed regulation, are the
possible candidates since once these functionalities fail, SUs
are not able to communicate effectively. For example, MUs
can directly jam the victim by injecting interference or deceive
SUs into believing that there is a PU by emulating the signal
characteristics of the PU, thereby evacuating the occupied
spectrum [9]. Moreover, the liability rule is vulnerable to
the selfish and greedy users aiming to maximize their own
private benefits. Since complying with the rule results in less
transmission opportunities, such SUs may not want to invest
efforts to follow the rule and thus will transmit simultaneously
with PUs [10].
In distributed cognitive radio ad hoc networks (abbreviated
as CRNs), the situation is more challenging because enforcing
the compliance of rules is virtually impossible. With the
sensing capability, SUs can acquire more information from
the surrounding environment than PUs, which results in in-
formation asymmetry between them. Without the threat of
being easily detected and punished from a central authority,
SUs with much more information and agile radio may cheat
intentionally. In this case, the well-known self-enforcement
among SUs [11] can not be achieved since the balance
between their own quality of service and the interference they
are causing to other users is upset by the strong incentives
of concurrent transmissions. This leads to a tragedy of the
commons dilemma [12] where a shared limited resource is
depleted beyond a recoverable level by individuals pursuing
their own best interests.
Inspired by ecological biology [13], PUs, SUs, and MUs
with different behaviors could be considered as different
species in an ecosystem. In [14], we discover evolutionary dy-
namics of CRN such that misbehaved SUs evolve to take over
the entire networks. Taking advantages of selfish nature, this
article further proposes an ecology-based DoS attack [15] from
adversary’s perspectives. In such a distributed DoS attack,
the randomly distributed MUs cooperatively induce originally
normal-behaved SUs to conduct concurrent transmissions by
showing them significant incentives to do that. Consequently,
both PUs and SUs suffer heavy interference and entire or
a substantial part of the network collapses. From ecological
aspect, such an attack can be interpreted as a process that
the native species perceive incentives from the behaviors of
invasive non-indigenous species, believe their behaviors are
more fitting to environment, and thus evolve to become one
of them.
We apply stochastic geometry [16] as the framework for
modeling the spatial distributions of PUs, SUs, and MUs to
quantitatively analyze the mutual interference among them,
which affects the quality of concurrent transmissions and
influences the behaviors of SUs. Via evolutionary game mod-
eling [17], [18] where the access strategy of each SU evolves
with the experienced interference and payoff, we can analyze
the time dynamics of (mis)behaved SUs and understand the
role of MUs in decline of the population of behaved SUs.
Based on the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) concept, we
identify the robust operating region where SUs can self-
enforce themselves to comply with the sharing rules, which
can aid in the widespread deployment of CR technology. The
numerical results show that fewer MUs are required by our
approach to create more severe damage in comparison to ex-
isting direct jamming attacks. With the additional information
acquired by sensing, the selfish SUs are easily induced to
pursue incentives and cause the ruin of the network.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II introduces basic features of CRN, and surveys existing
DoS attacks in CRN and emphasizes our contributions and
novelties. The proposed ecology-based DoS attack consist-
ing of three phases is described from both engineering and
evolutionary aspects in Section III. Section IV applies an
evolutionary game to analyze the dynamics of access strategy
of SUs during each phase of the attack. Numerical results are
provided in Section V and Section VI concludes this paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS
A. CR Ecosystems
Using terminologies from ecological biology, the entire CR
network can be viewed as an ecosystem [3], where SUs of
different spectrum access strategies are different species, the
common resource shared by all species are the vacant wireless
spectrum, and the fitness of an SU is the utility it received
given the profile of spectrum access strategies of all SUs. Two
essential operations must be ensured to guarantee the success
of the opportunistic access of CR ecosystem:‘
• An SU must collect and process information about coex-
isting users within its spectrum, which requires advanced
sensing and signal-processing capabilities.
• An SU must follow the sharing rule to allocate the
resource without or with constrained interfering the PUs.
To violate availability of CR ecosystems, the invasive
species, i.e., MUs, can easily force these two CR operations
nonfunctional. SUs affected by MUs can be viewed as a new
species (or mutuants) with the objective of disrupting the entire
ecosystem. Moreover, the interoperability and dynamic nature
in CR causes a burden on identity authentication and makes
environment more harsh. Thus, MU could easily take on multi-
ple identities and behaves as multiple distinct Sybil users [19].
The reconfiguration capability of CR needs downloading of
software module (e.g., waveform or radio application) and thus
is vulnerable to the malicious codes [5]. The above unique
features facilitate the realization of DoS attack and increase
the difficulty to catch the MUs.
B. Attack Taxonomy in CRN
In such harsh environment with possible vulnerabilities
introduced by new features of CR, security threats and DoS
attacks are receiving lots of attention. Survey of security
threats and DoS attacks in CRN are provided in [5], [6], [7],
[8] using different taxonomies. This paper further classifies
the DoS attacks with a novel taxonomy, which identifies the
major dimensions of an attack: targets chosen, vulnerabilities
exploited and actions taken.
• Target of attack: This dimension consists of SUs, PUs,
and the entire CRN service/technology. Typically, DoS
attacks in CRN try to deny the communication for legiti-
mate SUs even when the system resources are available.
In some cases, MUs target on PUs by directly jamming
or simulating SUs to cause interference. By incurring
destructive consequences on the entire network (including
both PUs and SUs), an attack could have a negative im-
pact on peoples’ acceptance and adoption of CR and thus
forestall the widespread deployment of CR technology.
• Cause of attack: This dimension includes the vulnerabili-
ties in CRN that could be exploited by the adversary, such
as shared wireless media, collaborative sensing, learning
mechanism, and the light-handed sharing rules.
• Action of attack: The communication of the victim can
be disabled by directly interfering to the receiver from
TABLE I
DOS ATTACKS IN COGNITIVE RADIO NETWORKS
Target of attack Action of attack
SUs PUs Service Interference False feedback
Cause of
Wireless feature Jamming o o o
Collaborative sensing SSDF [20] o o
Sharing rules PUEA [9] o o o
our work o o o o
MU. Alternatively, MU could intentionally feedback false
information to fool legitimate users for the potential gain.
Table I classifies the existing DoS attacks in CRN according
to proposed taxonomy and details are described as follows.
• Jamming Attack. The shared nature of the wireless
medium is vulnerable to jamming attacks. An MU can
randomly jam and disrupt any ongoing PU or SU commu-
nications by injecting interference. To obtain higher ben-
efits, multiple MUs are suggested to launch such attacks
to a target in a coordinated manner. Recent research [21]
adopts stochastic game extended from Markov decision
process to defend against jamming attacks.
• Primary User Emulation Attack. By exploiting the sharing
rules that protect PUs, an MU can compel an SU to vacate
the occupied spectrum by mimicking the PU [9]. Then,
the MU benefits from the exclusive usage of resources
released by the SU and the SU are prohibited from
exploiting vacant resources. This type of attack is more
efficient than conventional jamming since only low power
is needed to dominate the frequency band. To detect
and combat PUEA, a multitude of studies have been
proposed to identify the masquerading threat through
signal analysis [22], [23]
• Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification Attack. The accu-
racy of spectrum sensing is improved by leveraging the
observations from multiple SUs. In this case, an MU may
send other SUs dishonest reports to lead false conclu-
sion on the presence or absence of PUs. Consequently,
the MU benefits from the specific band evacuated by
SUs or PUs suffer the harmful interference caused by
SUs [20]. Substantial efforts have been spent to catch the
stealthy MU and ignore its reports by using reputation
metrics calculation, game theory, abnormality detection,
and Bayesian analysis [24].
In [5], [7], [6], [8], researchers point out a possible security
threat in CRN due to selfish and abnormal behaviors, where
MUs or SUs disrupt the sharing rules and access the spectrum
without authorization [25], [26]. To enforce compliance on
liability rule in CRN, [27] develops a model to investigate
whether a jail-based punishment is sufficient to convince an
SU to respect sharing rules. In the subsequent effort [2], a
coding architecture is proposed to identify SUs who cause
harmful interference. Our previous research [14] proposes
a model to quantitatively analyze the effects of breaking
the liability rule on the ecological survivability of CRN. In
contrast to the existing approaches, this attack stimulates SUs
to cause interference to both PUs and SUs. The resulting
network breakdown may forestall the widespread deployment
of CR. Instead of directly injecting interference, MUs induce
legitimate SUs to disrupt. As the avalanche effects in the
existing cascade-based attack in complex networks [28], ad-
versary can cause the same damage in targeted networks by
injecting a relatively small amount of traffic. By avoiding a
direct attack, the probability that an MU to be detected and
identified decreases [29], [30].
III. THE PROPOSED ECOLOGY-BASED DOS ATTACK
This section discusses the proposed attack from both evolu-
tionary and engineering perspectives. In evolutionary aspect,
users with different access strategies and behaviors are re-
garded as different species. Originally, all PUs and most of
SUs behave normally, which are considered as native species
in a balanced ecosystem [14], [3]. The stealthy MUs involving
later try to prevent usable reception on victims by forcing their
received SINR lower than the threshold. The invasive species,
i.e., MUs, simply act as mutants who conduct concurrent
transmissions with PUs. The reaction of SUs can be interpreted
as a process that the native species perceive misbehavior of
mutants (i.e., MUs), believe their behaviors have more fitness
to environment, and thus evolve to be one of them.
The primary goal of MUs is to prevent usable reception
on victims and thus MUs are assumed to be irrational, that
is, MUs do not care at all their quality of service and
consuming power. Generally, we assume that MUs use the
same transmission device as normal SUs to disguise their
real identities. However, the capability of MUs is much more
powerful than legitimate SUs. For example, an MU knows the
payoff of every user and knows a user is malicious or not [31].
Moreover, an MU can establish out-of-band fast channels to
collude with other MUs as well as to control Sybil identities
and its zombies to mount a cooperative attack [19].
To disrupt the reception on the primary target, PUs, MUs
always perform the attack during the period when PUs are
actively transmitting. As illustrated in Figure 1, the attack
consists into several phases. In the initial phase of the attack,
MUs act as normal SUs and stay silent. In the meanwhile,
MUs passively collect local environment parameters such as
numbers of surrounding PUs and SUs. By exchanging the
acquired information, MUs could estimate some global knowl-
edge about networks (such as user density) and accordingly
determine whether launching attack is efficient or not (see
Steps 1-3 in Figure 1).
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Fig. 1. The flow chart of attack procedure for MUs and the corresponding actions in SUs and PUs during each phase of the attack.
Once MUs decide to perform the attack, they enter the
inducing phase by acting as unintentional malfunctioning SUs
and injecting interference to surrounding users. MUs also
apply slotted ALOHA as MAC protocol and randomly execute
jamming to increase the difficulty to be detected. SUs detect
the existence of other SUs (pretended by MUs) and perceive
the concurrent transmissions arisen by MUs (see Step 7 in
Figure 1). Due to the selfish nature, SUs are beguiled to change
their access strategy by increasing their access probability to
much larger than 0 while ignoring PUs might be transmitting
(see Step 8 in Figure 1).
MUs with enhanced capability and global information could
estimate when SUs have been trapped in the transgression and
made primary transmission failed. By estimating the received
SINR received from all users, MUs could determine if SUs
start transmitting (see Step 4 in Figure 1). If SUs do transmit,
MUs transient into the final phase, inactive phase. In this
phase, MUs could act as regular SUs by deactivating the
malicious attempt and choosing the access strategy according
to SUs’ payoff function. Alternatively, MUs could just stop
transmitting to save power and to hide identities (see Step 6
in Figure 1).
The unique features of this novel attack are described as
follows.
• In contrast to the existing approaches, this attack stim-
ulates SUs to cause interference to both PUs and SUs.
The resulting vital outbreak may forestall the widespread
deployment of CR.
• In addition to exploiting the sharing rules to mount
a attack, the proposed attack utilizes the information
asymmetry between SUs and PUs as well as the nature
of selfishness to entice SUs to make concurrent transmis-
sions and thus interfere with the targets.
• Instead of directly injecting interference, MUs induce
legitimate SUs to disrupt. As the avalanche effects in the
existing cascade-based attack in complex networks [28],
adversary would be able to cause the same damage in
targeted networks by injecting a relatively small amount
of traffic. By decreasing the degree of attacking directly,
the probability that an MU to be detected and identified
is decreased.
IV. ANALYSIS OF SU BEHAVIORS UNDER THE ATTACK
A. Stochastic Geometry
The performance of communications among spatially scat-
tered nodes in wireless networks is highly constrained by the
received power and interference. To model the interference, the
spatial distribution and transmission features of the interferers
as well as the propagation characteristics of the media shall be
addressed. By adopting spatial point process to model the node
locations, the interference distributions and link outages can be
consequently analyzed. This article applies the homogeneous
Poisson point process (PPP) to model the random locations
of transmitters and receivers to get tractable analytical result
on performance of cognitive radio networks. With PPP, the
probability that there are n nodes in A is given by the Poisson
distribution (i.e., (λA)neλA/n!) where λ is the density of
nodes in a unit area.
We consider an ad hoc network on a slotted system con-
sisting of PUs, SUs and MUs utilizing the same spectrum.
Evolutionary 
Game
Stochastic 
Geometry
Strategy
Access 
Probability
Interaction
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CR
Fig. 2. The combination of stochastic geometry and evolutionary game theory
for the analysis of ecology-based DoS attack
The spatial distributions of primary transmitters (PTs) and SUs
are assumed to follow homogeneous Poisson point processes
(PPPs) with densities λPT and λSU , respectively. Each PT
has transmission power PPT and a dedicated primary receiver
(PR) located at a fixed distance rPT with an arbitrary direction.
The spatial distribution of PRs also forms a PPP with the same
density λPT correlated with that of PTs. SUs use fixed transmit
powers of PSU and transmission ranges of rSU .
The SUs with CR capability are assumed to sense and
distinguish signaling from PUs and surrounding SUs perfectly.
We consider the interweave paradigm for CR adaptation, that
is, SUs should comply with the sharing rule that PUs can
not be interfered at all. This implies that SUs only use the
spectrum that is not temporarily used by PUs and are obligated
to evacuate the spectrum upon sensing primary transmission.
The spatial distribution of MUs is also assumed to follow a
homogeneous PPP with density λMU , MUs use fixed transmit
powers of PMU and transmission ranges of rMU .
We consider path loss attenuation effects and Rayleigh
fading with unit average power in our channel model. The
path-loss exponent of transmission is denoted by α. Thus the
power at receiving side is denoted as PL(d) = Gd−α, where d
is the distance between the transmitter and receiver and G is the
channel power gain of the desired link which is exponentially
distributed with unit mean. Denote the signal-to-interference-
plus-noise ratios (SINRs) observed by a PR and an SU as γPR
and γSU , respectively. The primary and secondary transmis-
sions are respectively successful if P[γPR < ηPR] ≤ ǫPR and
P[γSU < ηSU ] ≤ ǫSU , where ηPR and ηSU are respectively
the SINR thresholds of a PR and an SU, and ǫPR and ǫSU
are respectively the outage constraints of a PR and an SU.
B. Evolutionary Game
Although stochastic geometry provide analytically tractable
tools for modeling the tradeoffs between the aggregate inter-
ference and spatial contentions, in reality wireless devices are
able to adjust the spectrum access parameters according to the
experienced spectrum status in order to maximize the system
throughput. In the ad hoc environment with one channel and
slotted Aloha MAC protocol, access probability control is an
instinctive solution for CR adaptation in interweave paradigm.
Each SU chooses from the same set of strategies and each
strategy corresponds to performing transmission with certain
probability. Take two strategies as an example, SUs can take
actions of staying silent and transmitting for sure. These
settings further complicate the system performance analysis
when such time dynamics are involved.
In addition to performing exhaustive experiments to specify
these aspects, evolutionary game models have been introduced
to investigate the interactions between the overall system per-
formance and the time-evolving access strategies by relating
the experienced performance (e.g., SINR, data loss rate) to
the game payoff. When the PU is transmitting, the payoff
function of an SU depends on the SU’s behavior under the
greedy nature. If an SU obeys the sharing rule and stays silent
when a PU is transmitting, it spends zero cost but obtains
some rewards κ, Furthermore, an SU may not want to break
the sharing rule if there is no other accomplice currently con-
ducting transmissions. This implies that payoff for secondary
transmission is zero if currently no other SU is perceived.
According to broken windows theory, the occurrence of other
SUs who break the rule encourage its own desire to behave
abnormally. In this case, the payoff function depends on if the
secondary transmission is successful or not (i.e., if the received
SINR at SU is higher than the threshold). We denote ν as the
cost of unsuccessful transmission and δ as the incentive of
successful transmission.
Since cognitive radio networks are deployed in an ad hoc
manner, at each stage each CR device tends to adjust its
access strategy based on the experienced payoff to maximize
its utility, which therefore forms an evolutionary access game.
As shown in Figure 2, to address the interactions between
the spatial contentions and the evolutionary access strategies,
we use stochastic geometry to characterize the aggregate
interference according to the spectrum access strategies at
each stage. The spectrum access strategies are associated with
the parameters of the stochastic geometry and the resulting
interference further affect the future spectrum access behav-
iors. This approach provides new insights on the temporal and
spatial interactions of spectrum access, which is particularly
useful in evaluating the stability of spectrum access protocols
or assessing the network robustness to attacks.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We investigate the dynamics of populations who comply
with the rules and make concurrent transmissions under the
DoS attack. We are also interested in the averaged SINRs
received at PRs and SUs, which reflects the effects of the
attack. This section investigates dynamics of access strategies
of SUs under the DoS attack. The system parameters are set
as α = 4, λPT = 10
−5
, ηPR = 3, ǫPR = 0.05, rPT = 15,
PPT = 0.3, λSU = 10
−3
, ηSU = 3, ǫSU = 0.1, rSU = 10,
PMU = PSU = 0.1, N = 10
−9 and λ̂MU = 10−7.
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Fig. 3. Evolutionary access dynamics when M = 2, δ = 10, ν = 1 and κ =
0. Non-mutants represent SUs which stay silent, and mutants represent SUs
which transmit for sure. The system parameters are set to be α = 4, λPT =
10−5, ηPR = 3, ǫPR = 0.05, rPT = 15, PPT = 0.3, λSU = 10
−3
,
ηSU = 3, ǫSU = 0.1, rSU = 10, PSU = PSU = 0.1, N = 10
−9 and
λˆMU = 10
−7
. The MUs enter inactive phase when the mutants’ population
exceed λ˜SU .
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Fig. 4. Averaged SINR when δ = 10, ν = 1 and κ = 0. The system
parameters are the same as Figure 3.
Figure 3 plots the evolution of the fraction of SUs who
conduct concurrent transmissions with PUs. Regarding the
parameters related to payoffs, we took (δ, ν, κ) as (10, 1, 0). In
the case of only two strategies, non-mutants represent behaved
SUs who stick to the rules, and mutants represent misbehaved
SUs that transmit for sure. Black line represents the maximum
allowable density of SUs when outage constraint of a PR is
satisfied (denoted by λ˜SU ) and red solid line represents the
fraction of SUs simultaneously transmitting with PUs (known
as induced SUs). After the population of mutants exceeds the
threshold λ˜SU , all primary transmissions fail. Under the same
parameter setup, Figure 4 plots the averaged SINRs received
at a PR and an SU over time. The black dashed line represents
that ηPR = ηSU = 3. Both figures show that if no rewards
are supported to SUs for compliance, all SUs will execute
concurrent transmissions due to the fact that the original
access strategy is not an attractive one for survivability. In this
case, the self-enforcement mechanism fails to regulate induced
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Fig. 5. Averaged SINR when δ = 10, ν = 1 and κ = 8. The positive reward
renders SUs stay silent when too many SUs are transmitting simultaneously.
The system parameters are the same as Figure 3.
0
2
4
6
8
10
0
2
4
6
8
10
0
2
4
6
8
10
δν
κ
robust region
fragile region
Fig. 6. Robust and fragile operating regions under different setups of
(δ, µ, κ).
SUs and behaved SUs are extinct. Consequently, significant
interference is incurred to PRs and SUs and thus the DoS
attack successfully breaks down the CRN.
Figure 5 plots the averaged SINRs received at a PR and
an SU when rewards are provided (i.e., κ = 8). This figure
shows that at beginning, mutants behave as the dominating
species due to the incentives associated with the concurrent
transmissions. When too many induced SUs coexist, SUs do
not benefit from misbehaving access due to heavy intra-system
interference suffered and consequently decide to stay silent
to gain reward associated with compliance. By comparing
Figures 3 and 5, we observe that the incentive-base solution
is feasible to prevent greedy behavior and thus the proposed
attack.
The numerical results of the robust region where the ex-
tinction of misbehaved SUs is guaranteed are illustrated in
Figure 6. With the robust region for ESS identified in Figure 6,
operator may therefore select appropriate (δ, µ, κ) so that the
CRN could operate in the desirable operating point, in the
sense that network breakdown will not occur. On the contrary,
the adversary could determine if the proposed attack is feasible
according to the predefined (δ, µ, κ).
VI. CONCLUSION
With selfish and greedy nature, SUs may not want to
invest effort in complying the sharing rule that no concurrent
transmission is allowed, and incur harmful interference to PUs.
Inspired by the behaviors of invasive species in an ecosystem
coexisted with native species, we propose a novel ecology-
based DoS attack where MUs induce original well-behaved
SUs to collaboratively transmit by showing them significant
incentives to do so. As a result, SUs generate interference
to PUs and other SUs, which eventually collapses the entire
network. The proposed ecology-based DoS attack is difficult to
be detected since, by acting as malfunctioning SUs, MUs are
hard to be identified. Using evolutionary access game model,
misbehaved SUs are modeled as mutants with distinct access
strategy, and the dynamics of access strategies under the attack
are analyzed. Numerical results show that the existence of
fragile operating region at which SUs are eventually induced
to make concurrent transmissions ensures the effectiveness of
the attack. The proposed attack demonstrates that when CRs
are introduced, the resulting information asymmetry among
heterogeneous nodes makes the spectrum sharing mechanism
vulnerable and fragile. A robust CRN of cooperation design
which is resilient to the proposed inducing attacks is therefore
of urgent need in the future.
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